Abstract: Although scholarly attention has been paid to Ibn al-Qayyim's popular Kitāb al-rūḥ, the soulrelated views of his master are still ignored. Hence, this paper traces some of these ideas in Ibn Taymiyya's Khalq al-rūḥ, in which he asserts the soul's origination rather than its eternity, so as to uphold the idea of God's essence. This paper consists of two parts. Part I problematizes Khalq in light of previous research, presents the sources of the study, and addresses some concepts that are significant for appreciating the development of its main argument. The five major arguments that Ibn Taymiyya invokes to justify his viewpoint shall be reconstructed from Khalq. Likewise, some of the ambiguities surrounding his identification of those who hold opposite views shall be resolved. Part II provides an annotated translation of Khalq.
1 His student E. E. Calverley and I. R. Netton cite it extensively and recommend it in their encyclopedia entry on the same topic. 2 Macdonald's interest in psychology might have inspired his doctoral student F. T. Cooke to study and translate, under his supervision, Ibn al-Qayyim's (d. 751/1350) Kitāb al-rūḥ, the most famous work on the soul in Arabic literature. 3 In 1935, Cooke published an article to introduce Kitāb al-rūḥ, without referencing his previous work. 4 Tzvi Langermann published two articles on this book: the first one shows Ibn al-Qayyim's appropriation of philosophical terms for Islamic usage, 5 and the second one studies the book's structural development.
6
Asserting that Kitāb al-rūḥ represents the standard work on the soul's psychology and eschatology for the majority of Muslims, Macdonald devotes more space in his article to it. He opines that Ibn al-Qayyim sticks to Ḥanbalī literalism, which venerates scriptural authority. Like Macdonald, Cooke avers that Ibn al-Qayyim fits the soul into a material scheme that defies al-Ghazālī's (d. 505/1111) dismissal of predicating the soul on spatial terms: "His materialistic system, acceptable to the vast majority of Muslims, has been instrumental in keeping Islām true to its genius for theological concretion." Tzvi Langermann, "Ibn al-Qayyim's Kitāb al-rūḥ: Some Literary Aspects," in Islamic Theology, Philosophy and Law: Debating Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, ed. Birgit Krawietz and Georges Tamer (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012) , . 7 Cooke, "Ibn al-Qaiyim," 131. 8
To some extent, this conclusion is true. In Khalq, Ibn Taymiyya draws on some Ḥanbalī sources. Another study shows that he would even concur with "al-Ashʿarī's self-identification as a follower of Ibn Ḥanbal" al-Islām and his disciple are known to historians of sciences "on account of their thorough and robust refutations of so-called occult sciences, especially astrology." "Their motivations were more theological than philosophical or scientific." 9 Furthermore, Langermann aptly speaks of Ibn al-Qayyim's twenty-first query in Kitāb al-rūḥ as largely being "an essay on morals." 10 While these works introduce Ibn al-Qayyim's Kitāb al-rūḥ, the germane and inspirational ideas of his intellectual master Ibn Taymiyya are ignored. Tracing some of these ideas, this paper provides an analytical introduction to as well as an annotated translation of a fatwa issued by Shaykh al-Islām Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Taymiyya, one that I call Khalq al-rūḥ (hereinafter Khalq) . This text presents his position on the origination, eschatology, and corporeality of the soul.
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Statement of the Problem
In Khalq, Ibn Taymiyya argues for the soul's createdness rather than its eternity. I argue that he adopts this position to salvage and uphold the idea of God's essence vis-à-vis the human soul. He marshals diverse arguments that feature some proponents of his viewpoint, as well as categories of those who oppose it, whom he identifies in rather ambivalent terms. For him, believing in the soul's coeternity with God's essence has moral implications. Although Ibn Taymiyya manages to answer the questions he is asked in Khalq, his response poses certain problems. This paper is designed to address them.
The first problem is concerned with his methodology. For instance, he answers questions about a philosophical issue in a didactic religious language. This aspect of his work deserves an explanation. Also, he is ambivalent about his terminology. Despite the significance of the concept "God's essence" to his main argument, we
are not told what this concept means in Khalq and, therefore, one needs to look elsewhere in his oeuvre for an explanation. Furthermore, while Ibn Taymiyya justifiably uses "spirit" interchangeably with "soul," he does not compare both concepts in Khalq; rather, he states that related discussions can be found in his other works.
The second problem concerns his referential authorities. We are informed, in fairly satisfying detail, of the scholarly positions he invokes in Khalq, which covers several pages of the fatwa. This is understandable, because he is asked to expound upon the opinions of "the People of the Sunna." 12 However, he devotes one ambiguous paragraph to those who hold the opposite view. His reticence leaves us confused as to what he means by the first category (i.e., "the Sabian philosophers") and the other category (i.e., "the Sufis, Kalām theologians, and traditionists"), whom he describes as the "heretics of this community and its straying people." 13 As such, this introduction seeks to rationalize his overall argument in two steps: 1) Coming to terms with his methodology by identifying his epistemology and understanding of "God's essence" and "soul" as analytical concepts and 2) Reconstructing, via his referential backdrop in Khalq, the involved allied and opposing arguments from his other works. Only the second category, which he refers to ambivalently, will be discussed below. As this paper is primarily concerned with making sense of his opinions on the soul's origination in Khalq and related pieces, the topic is not discussed from the viewpoints of other scholars. 14 
Primary Sources of the Study
Given the nature of Khalq, this fatwa does not fully answer the questions that it poses. Hence, reference will be made to Ibn Taymiyya's other works to envision the background of his position. The analytical method used is partly inspired by the French theorist Gérard Genette's transtextuality, which comprises such categories as metatextuality (explicit and implicit textual references) and intertextuality (overt and covert quotations). 15 Presented below is an inventory of Ibn Taymiyya's works that are cited in this paper. Works with an asterisk (*) before the short title 12 Khalq, MF, 4:216. 13 Ibid, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] 14 For representative case studies, see a collection of articles edited by Ayman Shihadeh, "The Ontology of the Soul in Medieval Arabic Thought," The Muslim World, 102.3-4 (2012) are cited more than once. For the two collections of FK and MF, the title of the section or treatise from which a citation is made will be mentioned before the short title. For non-Taymiyyan works, full bibliographical information is given the first time they are mentioned, and subsequently followed with short titles. 
Coming To Terms With Ibn Taymiyya's Epistemology and Terminology
One perplexing aspect of Ibn Taymiyya's scholarship in Khalq is scripturalism, which he adopts to address a philosophical issue. At the end of this work, he states that human knowledge is limited and yet the fraction of that knowledge with which people are endowed should be guided by divine revelation, especially on matters related to the soul, which is from God's command. In the middle of this work, he cites multiple canonical texts to support his position on the soul's createdness. At the beginning, he invokes as authoritative the consensus of the ancients of the Muslim community (Salaf) in identifying some issues at stake in the ontology of the soul. 17 Here he dwells largely upon quotations from theologians, traditionists, and mystics, while considering those who hold opposite views as the "heretics of this community."
18
In addition to Macdonald's and Langermann's notes on Ibn Taymiyya's methodology, we learn from Ḥilmī that Ibn Taymiyya's position on the soul constitutes a "religious" theory inspired by the Sharīʿa. 19 In his study of a Taymiyyan treatise on the world's eternity, Hoover observes that ʿImrān represents a "philosophical inter- pretation and defence of tradition." 20 Ibn Taymiyya's appropriation of philosophical discourse helps to appreciate his engagement with philosophers and speculative theologians by using their own jargon.
It has been argued that "God's essence" is an important analytical concept in Ibn Taymiyya's overall argument in Khalq. This concept features in Ibn Ḥanbal's Christology argument and in al-Nahrajūrī's argument against incarnationist eternalists. As will be shown below, each argument marshaled in Khalq is meant to salvage and uphold the idea of God's essence. Basically, the soul both originates from and returns to God, as Ibn Taymiyya's eschatology outlines. He believes that the doctrines of pantheism, monism, and incarnation, as well as their underpinnings, compromise God's essence and human morality.
Although his approach implies that God's essence is indefinable, Ibn Taymiyya nevertheless considers it identical with God's attributes. Any God-human assimilation of the essence and attributes is unorthodox. The word "essence" itself (Ar. dhāt) presents a challenge: It is feminine. To some linguists, among them Ibn Barhān (d. 456/1064) and al-Jawālīqī (d. 540/1145), it cannot be used in reference to God without being associated with other words, for each word combination would produce an expression of one of God's attributes. In this respect, "God's essence" would be identical with "God's knowledge," "God's power," "God's mercy," and so on. 21 Now, if rational theologians were to inquire how God, for instance, seats Himself upon the Throne, Ibn Taymiyya challenges them to speak of the how-ness of God's essence (kayf a Huw a fī dhātih i ?). Therefore, one would have to conclude that the impossibility of identifying God's essence with human essence entails the impossibility of identifying God's attributes with human attributes.
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Owing to their finite knowledge, humans cannot apprehend the essence of their own souls. Ibn Taymiyya contends that whereas God's essence is identical with God's attributes, the human soul is not identical with the human body. Shaykh al-Islām's position on the soul is "midway between reductionists and assimilationists," meaning that the soul is neither immaterial, as philosophers claim, nor is it part of the body like blood, as some theologians claim. "We rather believe," he writes, "that the spirit is an entity that exists differently from the body. It is not identical with the body. Throughout Khalq, Ibn Taymiyya holds that the "spirit" is created as opposed to being coeternal with God's essence. He first indicates that "soul" is interchangeable with "spirit" in the Eschatology argument, in which he cites canonical texts on death and its aftermath. This principle, namely, the soul's separation from the body at death, defines his position on the spirit in other works, notably Nafs.
25 Following this approach, "soul" and "spirit" will be used interchangeably in this introduction. Now, if the soul is neither immaterial nor part of the body, as indicated above, then what is it? In Khalq, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that the spirit is "a self-subsisting entity; it goes and comes, and it is subject to bliss and torment." 26 This short description unravels his treatment in Nafs, where we learn more about his middle position. The philosophers' notion of the soul reduces it to an immaterial substance that only recognizes universals and makes rational choices, as Avicenna (d. 428/1037) maintains. 27 Ibn Taymiyya seems to share their view that the soul does not belong to the species of recognizable bodies that occupy space. However, he avers that it can be pointed to (yushār u ilayh ā ), ascends and descends, gets out of the body, and is seized out of it. 28 Here, he uses canonical texts to define his position, as opposed to the works of philosophers, who consider the soul just as eternal as the Necessary Being. For Ibn Taymiyya, however, an entity stripped of its attributes is an impossible being.
Although he describes the soul as self-subsisting, thereby converging with al-Ghazālī, who nevertheless considers the soul to be immaterial, 29 Ibn Taymiyya highlights the importance of its relation to the body in matters of sensation and accountability and concludes that it is a physical being within the body. Thus, he disqualifies the assumption that the "soul" and the "spirit" are essences that subsist independently of the body. 30 But he does not stop here, for elsewhere he disputes the "greatest proof" advanced by the philosophers to argue for the soul's immateriality: Knowledge inheres in it. If the soul were material, it would be subject to division and thus knowledge would be subject to division. This scenario is impossible, if universals, for instance, are the object of knowledge. Ibn Taymiyya responds to this proof in five points.
First, knowledge subsists in the soul, just as life, power, will, love, and hate subsist in it. Therefore, that which applies to these accidents also applies to knowledge. Second, al-Ghazālī falsified the claim that everything that inheres in a body must be divisible, arguing that the estimative power discerns that which is intangible within a tangible object, such as a sheep's apprehension of the wolf's enmity. 31 Third, knowledge, power, life, and other accidents subsisting in the soul remain only if the soul remains, just as the accidents of life, power, and sensation subsisting in the body remain only as long as the body is alive. Fourth, universals do not exist entirely in the external reality; they exist also in the minds. Fifth, some loci, among them the soul, cannot undergo division. While some Muʿtazilīs, Ashʿarīs, and Karrāmīs believe that the soul is composed of single substances, some philosophers hold that it is composed of material and form. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya passes a judgment here. He thinks that the philosophers' claim that the soul is not a physical being is both correct (because they deny that it is composite and divisible) and incorrect (they assert that all sentient objects to which one can point are composite and divisible). Since they claim that everything to which one can point is a body and that a body is composed as such, they have to conclude that the soul cannot be pointed to physically. In summary, Ibn Taymiyya asserts the soul's physicality, saying that it is tangible because it sees, smells, tastes, and hears via the body's agency. Thus the soul and the body affect each other. In other words, when the soul experiences love, satisfaction, happiness, or sadness, such experiences affect the body. Also, when the body is hot or cold, hungry or satiated, such experiences, in turn, affect the soul. Since the body is specific to one entity, it only affects the soul that is associated with it. Thus the body must indicate and identify this particular soul. The indicator is physical, and thus the soul is also physical.
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Ibn Taymiyya's Arguments for the Soul's Createdness
Having addressed the first problem by coming to terms with Ibn Taymiyya's basic analytical concepts in Khalq, we now address the second problem: the arguments underlying his position on the soul's createdness and the implied opposite views. These can be gleaned primarily from Khalq, with explications from some of his other works. In Khalq, Ibn Taymiyya is especially ambivalent about his double categorization of the holders of opposite views in MF, 4:221-22. Only the second category will be addressed here, for it is quite germane to this paper's overall argument.
33 Something shall be said about his authorities in Khalq before rescuing the content of their statements, which underlie his multilayered argument therein.
In Minhāj, Ibn Taymiyya provides a hierarchy of referential authorities through which the disciplines of Islamic knowledge were communicated from the first/ sixth century to the fifth/eleventh century. 34 Some of these authorities appear in Khalq. Considering the authorities cited in Khalq, one wonders if the doctrine of the soul in classical scholarship, as outlined in Ibn al-Qayyim's famous Kitāb alrūḥ, 35 is heavily influenced by Ibn Taymiyya's Ḥanbalī sources. Indeed, in Khalq Ibn Taymiyya tends to cite authorities who are associated with Ḥanbalism. However, the reality is more complex than school affiliation. For one thing, his background is 32 Darʾ, The first category has induced extensive research on the Sabian philosophers, the origination of worldly bodies, and causality. As these subjects make this paper unnecessarily long, they will be dispensed with. For God's creation of this world in Ibn Taymiyya, see Jon Hoover, "Perpetual." 34 Minhāj, 7:425-28. 35 Francis Cooke speaks of "the belief of the great majority of Muslims" ("Ibn al-Qaiyim's Kitāb al-Rūḥ," 129), and E. Calverley speaks of "the dominant Muslim doctrine" ("Nafs," EI 2 , 7:882) of the soul as constituted by this work. too rich to be described as merely Ḥanbalī. For example, the diversity of the voices cited therein allows us to hear not only from jurists, traditionists, and theologians, but also from mystics.
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Five major arguments can be rescued from the authorities chosen to defend his position on the human soul's temporal origination, with a view to upholding the idea of God's essence. Listed in the order of their appearance, they are: the Christology argument, the Covenant argument, the Antinomianism argument, the Eschatology argument, and the Linguistic argument. As Ibn Taymiyya does not say that he is presenting this or that argument, the reconstruction attempted here reflects my own interpretation of Khalq in light of his other works. Concerning the second point, we read in Darʾ that the Sumanīs (i.e., Indian Buddhists) were like those Greek naturalist philosophers who negated incorporeal existence and therefore believed only in sentient beings. In their debate with Jahm, they wondered if he could perceive God by any of the five senses. Jahm furnished a response that apparently maintained God's Holiness-He cannot be predicated on spatial terms-simultaneously concluding that the soul is immaterial. Inspired by "Christian heretics," so Ibn Taymiyya says, those who believe that the spirit of Jesus is the spirit of God and is from God's essence, Jahm argues that the rational soul is immaterial, just as God exists but cannot be seen, heard or smelled. Ibn Taymiyya considers Jahm a victim of misrepresentation, since the unbelieving Sumanī interlocutors confused him: "They made him think that humans cannot recognize what they do not perceive, as if the principle is that what is not sentient is not recognizable." 39 However, the victimized Jahm produced another argument that is pertinent to the first justification above, using analogical reasoning: The Qurʾān is created because Jesus is created. Citing Q4:171, he argues that Jesus is God's word and a spirit from Him, but he is created, and because the Qurʾān is God's word, it is likewise created. Ibn Ḥanbal disqualifies this response on the grounds that Jesus was originated by the agency of God's word, which is primordially uncreated. The implication of this exchange is that the spirit of Jesus is likewise originated by God's command and so cannot be coeternal with God's essence. Therefore, his divinity is excluded. shipping Jesus, nor when they said that he is the son of God and said that he is God." 43 Ibn Taymiyya builds on this argument to markedly conclude that everything proving man's servanthood, creation, and subjection to God demonstrates that man's spirit is originated.
Like al-Kharrāz, Abu Yaʿqūb al-Nahrajūrī (d. 330/941) is a major mystical authority. He is cited in Khalq as an advocate of the Antinomianism argument. 44 His mysticism is particularly opposed to the moral decadence arising from the hedonism of those who believe in the oneness of being. Hagiographical works indicate a relationship between him and the famous al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922) that ended with the former's condemnation of the latter as having been "served by demons." For this doctrinal reason, they parted company. 45 This reference expounds al-Nahrajūrī's hostility toward eternalists "who end up in antinomianism." It also invites reflection upon the creed of al-Ḥallāj, one of his foremost adversaries.
Ideologically speaking, al-Ḥallāj is famous for his theopathic utterance "I am the Truth." 46 Ibn Taymiyya relates this identification with the Divine to the Christian claim of Jesus' divinity and to the Muslim exaggerators' claim of the divinity of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) and al-Ḥākim the Fāṭimid (d. 411/1021). 47 Despite these connotations, Ibn Taymiyya finds in other statements made by al-Ḥallāj a refutation of the soul's eternity. Al-Ḥallāj said: "Everything that is assembled by means of an intermediary is held together by its powers."
48 "This is a response," comments Ibn Taymiyya, "to those who speak of the spirit's eternity or of the Creator's indwelling in the created." For him, bodily organs are an intermediary or a tool (adāh) whereby the human being is assembled, and their powers hold man together. Man's need of these tools and powers means that man is not self-sufficient and is, therefore, not divine. 49 Thus this lack of self-sufficiency, as indicated by al-Ḥallāj's counterargument, implicates the origination of the human soul, for eternity is an exclusive attribute of the self-sufficient God.
This exception, however, does not supersede the doctrine of Divine love, which jeopardizes the uprightness of human behavior. The uncalculated love of God espoused by al-Ḥallāj might lead to immorality, understood as the monists' disregard for ethical boundaries. This pattern verges on heterodoxy. Part of Ibn Taymiyya's legacy is concerned with refuting this type of belief and its implications.
50 Henri Laoust, the pioneer of Taymiyyan studies, observes that the Ḥanbalīs responded to a need for moralism and that Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal's doctrine was dominated by ethical preoccupations. 51 Hoover likewise writes: "Ibn Taymiyya often concerns himself with the ethical implications of theological doctrines. This is especially apparent when he traces the sources of antinomian practices."
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Following the Antinomianism argument, eschatology and linguistics are invoked with a special Taymiyyan flavor. On the one hand, the Damascene theologian assembles multiple canonical texts only to let them speak for themselves. His scripturalism, as I stated above, is perplexing and, therefore, his canonical citations in Khalq need to be explained. On the other hand, he provides a kind of philosophy of the language to advance his position on the soul's origination. Toward this end, the contours of the argument require an interdisciplinary investigation of pertinent exegetical, theological, mystical, and historical aspects.
The Eschatology argument (MF, presents us with the problem of eschatological scripturalism spelled out in several quotations from the Qurʾān and ḥadīth about death and postmortem experiences. Marcia Hermansen notes that eschatology is a combination of individual and cosmic elements that link humanity's fate to the purpose and destiny of creation. She states that it is significant "because of the qurʾanic stress on the intelligibility of history as well as on individual human accountability." 53 The background of this note can be found in God's saying: "Did you think that We created you uselessly and that to Us you would not be returned?" This exegetical comment shows what is at stake in history and cosmology in relation to human behavior and accountability. God creates humans for a purpose and they ultimately return to Him. Likewise, God maintains divine guidance by sending messengers, which means that prophecy perfects cosmology. 55 If this were not the case, then creation would have been aimless. 56 Ibn Taymiyya states that messengers were sent to establish theological (God's oneness and attributes, etc.), legal (ethics), and eschatological (destination and recompense) principles, all of which justify God's "creation (khlaq) and command (amr)." Also, the "happiness and success" of humans are contingent upon them.
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Complementing creation with prophecy makes history intelligible. The same relation applies to humanity's fate and accountability. These dynamics are at work in the canonical texts that Ibn Taymiyya quoted in Khalq. He cited them to prove that the soul is created, for they represent the duality of reward and punishment as spiritual and physical experiences in the afterlife. Through this proof, he sought to strike a balance by neutralizing the religious experience so that it would not be taken as purely spiritual. He also aimed to tame the indulgence of materialists. Furthermore, he presented these texts as a likely response to the Avicennan claim that the "outer meaning of the laws cannot be used as an argument" in matters like eschatology and theology.
58 By this usage, Avicenna invites an understanding of the eschatological vocabulary appropriate to the elites, who should take these ideas metaphorically, whereas the common people are expected to understand them literally.
Ibn Taymiyya also cites a parable on the body-soul accountability for evildoing, 59 a trope that is found in his other works. For example, in one place he says: MF, 11:97) ." 56 On the divine wisdom in creation, see Özervarli, "Divine Wisdom, " 40ff. 57 Iʿtiṣām, MF, 19:96. 58 Yahya Michot, "Revelation, " in The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, 192. 59 Khalq, MF, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] "The rectitude of the heart and the tongue involves the rectitude of both the spirit and the body. Since the body is paired with the spirit, the body cannot act voluntarily except with the participation of the spirit."
60 In another place, he comments on the parable-tradition: "Those who call [the spirit] 'rational soul' agree that it is associated with the body to attain its perfections."
61 Here, Ibn Taymiyya argues theologically for what Avicenna argues for philosophically: To attain perfection, the soul needs to clothe itself with matter (i.e., the body). An Avicennan specialist writes: "The soul can only become perfect by existing in the body and having the sense experiences that provide the opportunity for abstraction."
62 On the other hand, a Baṣran Muʿtazilī holds that rationalists "know that it is this body who deserves blame for its evil acts and praise for doing good."
63 So, the Eschatology argument, meant to prove the soul's origination, has shown Ibn Taymiyya's literalism versus rationalism in approaching canonical texts. Ibn Taymiyya is aware that divine revelation is better understood through the mechanism of Arabic syntax. Commenting, therefore, on "the spirit is from the command of my Lord (al-rūḥ u min amr i Rabbī)" (Q17:85), he says that "spirit" means either an angel or the human spirit. However, neither meaning implies that the spirit is eternal. He justifies this stance by analyzing the term "command" (amr) grammatically. It could be either a verbal noun (commanding) or an object (something commanded). 65 Since the spirit, in Ibn Taymiyya's definition, is a self-subsist- World 102.3-4 (2012), 427. 64 Khalq, MF, 4:220. 65 For the same distinction concerning the world being a matter and command, see Jon Hoover, "Perpetual, " 305. Cf. ʿImrān, MF, 18:215. ing entity, it is subject to God's command and lordship, as well as to the divinely promised bliss or torment after death. Even theologians who believe that the spirit is an accident subsisting in the human body think that it is from God's command.
In this respect, he justifies this interpretation with three authorities cited in Khalq. The first authority is al-Kharrāz, who says: "The command of God Most High is what is commanded and brought into being by the agency of the One Who brought it into being." 66 This note does not appear in the Covenant argument, cited earlier in Khalq. The second authority is Ibn Ḥanbal who has already stated that Jesus was created by the agency of God's word and that he himself is not the word. The third authority is Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) , who maintains that the spirit is related to God because it comes into being by God's command or word.
Apart from these Khalq authorities, the Qurʾānic commentator Ibn ʿAṭiyya (d. 542/1147) might have influenced Ibn Taymiyya's syntactical explanation. In his exegesis, this Andalusian exegete says that "the spirit is from the command of my Lord" and that "command" (amr) typifies the spirit, which is among the things that are known to God alone. In this sense, the spirit is related to God, just as a creation is related to the Creator. Alternatively, "command" is a verbal noun of amara and yaʾmuru, thereby meaning that the spirit came into being by God's word or command: "Be/Come into being." 67 We find a very concise inspiration for Ibn ʿAṭiyya's double interpretation in al-Wāḥidī (d. 468/1076) who, commenting upon this part of Q17:85, maintains that "the spirit is from the command of my Lord" means that "it is from my Lord's knowledge (so you do not know it); from my Lord's creation (i.e., created by Him)."
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Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) gives a brilliant explanation in his exegesis: "God's command" stands for "God's action." This he further explains as "God's formation and bringing into existence." He thus concludes that the Jews asked Prophet Muḥammad whether the spirit is eternal or originated. In response, al-Rāzī suggests, the Prophet said that it is originated. Al-Rāzī considers "knowledge" at the verse's end-"and you were not given of knowledge except a little"-a proof of his exegetical note. In the primordial state of fiṭra (natural constitution), the spirit is void of all sciences and knowledge and only acquires them later in time. Attaining perfection through knowledge after a state of deficiency marked with ignorance indicates that the soul is originated.
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Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya posits that the preposition "from" in "from (min) the command of my Lord" indicates either genus (jins) or starting point (ibtidāʾ alghāya). He says that the second meaning applies to the spirit, having been started from God and formed by His command, and thereby created. Again he invokes Ibn Ḥanbal's Christology, such that the spirit was breathed into Jesus from God's command. Although self-subsisting entities originate from God's command, they are not coeternal with God's essence because God's command is one of God's attributes, all of which are eternal.
The Linguistic argument continues with another linguistic subtlety, namely, relation (iḍāfa), which Ibn Taymiyya gleans from Ibn Ḥanbal's response to Christianity concerning the relating of Jesus to God's essence: "Relating the spirit to God is a relation of ownership and creation," rather than a "relation of an attribute to the being thereby described."
70 Ibn Taymiyya's corpus includes commentaries on this particular theme, 71 which also resolves his ambiguity about the second category of those who opposed his view on the soul.
In Darʾ, Ibn Taymiyya identifies two groups as misguided about relating things to God: 1) Those who, including the negators of God's attributes like the Jahmīs and Muʿtazilīs, considered everything related to God to be created by Him and subject to His lordship, and 2) those who, including some incarnationist Sunnīs, considered things related to God to be God's attributes. He contends that both groups consider "God's word" to be equal to "a spirit from Him." In other words, God's eternal speech is identical with God's creation, which is originated by the agency of God's word. However, the negators of God's attributes say that both the human spirit and God's words are created and therefore distinct from God. Also, the incarnationists say that as God's word is one of God's attributes, it does not belong to created beings. Thus they conclude that the spirit, which they hold is from God, is an uncreated attribute of God. In his Darʾ, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that Ibn ʿAqīl "looked extensively into the Muʿtazilī literature" and was greatly influenced by it. 74 Later he says, "When Ibn ʿAqīl probed the theology of the Muʿtazilīs, he did not approve of their way."
75 He described this scholar as an outstanding theologian who had fluctuating opinions and an impact on other Ḥanbalīs. Along the same line, George Makdisi observes that Ibn ʿAqīl was an independent thinker whose Muʿtazilī inspiration gave the Ḥanbalī movement a new direction. 76 Ibn Taymiyya approvingly maintains that he was a brilliant scholar who speculated about different schools and therefore expanded his theological horizons. As a result, he would sometimes adopt the Muʿtazilī approach of negating God's reported attributes (ṣifāt khabariyya), calling them "relations" (iḍāfāt). From this attitude comes his influence on Ibn al-Jawzī, as will be explained shortly. Other times, Ibn ʿAqīl would affirm God's attributes and blame the Muʿtazilīs for their reductionism. Ibn Taymiyya equates him with al-Ghazālī, Ibn Ḥazm, and al-Rāzī, all of whom, despite their erudition, contradicted themselves.
77
Concisely documenting the various theological positions on God's attributes, Ibn Taymiyya says that "a strong Muʿtazilī material" would sometimes appear in Ibn ʿAqīl's statements about God's attributes, predetermination, and saintly miracles, given that al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-36) 81 Blankinship confirms that Ibn al-Jawzī was a traditionist (muḥaddith) who was-and still is-considered authoritative in the Ḥanbalī school, and his anti-literalist reading of God's attributes represents "an important milestone in classical Muslim discourse about the nature of God." 82 This note explains Makdisi's observation about the new trend that Ibn ʿAqīl, a main source of inspiration to Ibn al-Jawzī, had set.
According to Ibn Taymiyya, the other misguided group in this regard claimed that relating the human spirit to God makes it eternal, as God's essence is eternal. Even though they are associated with the Muslim community, they emulate Christians in identifying Jesus' soul with God's essence. In Darʾ, the followers of Shaykh ʿAdī belong to this category. 83 This brief note calls for explanation.
In MF, Ibn Taymiyya has a work entitled "The Great Counsel" (al-Waṣiyya alkubrā) or "The Sunnī Message to the ʿAdawī Group" (al-Risāla al-Sunniyya ilā al-ṭāʾifa al-ʿAdawiyya), a letter that he had sent to the followers of Shaykh ʿAdī b. Musāfir 
Conclusion
Here I end the introduction with a double conclusion. The first conclusion brings in a statement that is quite germane to Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology. He quotes it from al-Junayd, a mystical authority whom he highly prizes. 90 In my opinion, this statement draws together all of the threads that comprise the overall argument presented in Khalq and my interpretation thereof. In Shādhilī, Ibn Taymiyya reports that when al-Junayd was asked to define tawḥīd (upholding God's oneness), he stated concisely: "To uphold God's oneness is to isolate origination from eternity (al-twaḥīd u ifrād u al-ḥudūth i ʿan i al-qidam i )." Here Ibn Taymiyya appreciates al-Junayd as "a leader of guidance" and his viewpoint as an exposition of "the disease from which many [incarnationists and unionists] suffer."
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Reflecting upon Ibn Taymiyya's approach to God's essence and its relation with God's attributes, his position on the soul's corporeality and arguments for its origination, one finds that al-Junayd's statement vividly captures Ibn Taymiyya's epistemology on God's essence and attributes vis-à-vis the human soul. In this sense, the soul's origination entails the affirmation of God's essence and of God's attributes as eternal and unidentifiable with the human being's essence and soul. Naturally, this is the purpose of Islamic monotheism (tawḥīd), i.e., single God out as the one and only divinity, unparalleled in nature. One is uncertain whether Francis Cooke had in mind this interpretation when he spoke of Islam's "genius for theological concretion," or by this description he only meant that Ibn al-Qayyim's eschatology was suggestive of materialism in the postmortem and the afterlife's events. Either way, this sharp insight resulted from his reflection upon the work of Ibn Taymiyya's disciple.
Just as Ibn Taymiyya meant to uphold God's essence, he also wanted to uphold human morals by rejecting notions of the soul's eternity and identification with God's essence. I. R. Al Fārūqī argues (italics mine): "The Christian doctrine of the incarnation through its idea of a God immanent in the flesh and hence in nature, eased the transfer from the Semitic notion of a transcendent God who is the absolute standard of beauty, truth and morality, to man as absolute standard. The second conclusion presents general observations about the methodology of Shaykh al-Islām, a pragmatic theologian who was concerned with maintaining a pristine version of Islamic belief and praxis. In his approach to the human soul, he essentially focuses upon God as well as the soul's provenance and destination. Hence more theological, spiritual and linguistic treatments emerge from his corpus than do philosophical treatments of the problem of the soul's eternity, despite his appropriation of the philosophers' language. As a theologian, he stands midway between the reductionists and the assimilationists in terms of God's attributes. As a spiritualist, his position is midway between those of the incarnationists and the naturalists concerning human soul. As a linguist, he works across Islamic disciplines.
Despite his loyalty to Ḥanbalism, Ibn Taymiyya is not indiscriminate. Ibn Ḥan-bal remains a major source of inspiration for him, and yet Ibn Taymiyya does not hesitate to criticize Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn ʿAqīl, and Ibn Ḥāmid. Nor is he totally antagonistic to those who hold opposite views. Known for his attacks on al-Ghazāli, he nevertheless employs some of the latter's arguments to further his own positions. He is iconoclastic of al-Ḥallāj, but appreciates some of his views. The diversity of voices cited in his works to support or challenge his own argument indicates his tolerance, which is sometimes blemished with harshness.
For Ibn Taymiyya, scripturalism represents the solution to intellectual problems lying outside the scope of certain human knowledge. However, his scripturalism is fully informed with the legacy of scholarship. Hence, he utilizes the most significant works written by earlier Islamic scholars. Taking nothing at face value, he engages in critical and even controversial disputes, for which he musters his intellectual capability in order to make full use of his familiarity with the tools of the craft. His scholarship is amazingly erudite and precise, and those who study him often find themselves hard pressed to choose, verify, and incorporate his ideas synthetically. a remainder of the people of knowledge to call those who were going astray to guidance and to have patience with their abuse, revive the dead by means of the Book of God, and give vision to the people of blindness by means of God's light. How many people killed by Iblīs did they revive! How many people who had strayed and become lost did they guide! How beautiful was their impact on people, and [how] ugly the impact of people on them! They drove away from God's Book the distortion (taḥrīf) of the exaggerators, the [undue] assumptions of the falsifiers, and the interpretations of the ignorant, 110 those who had tied the banners of innovation 111 and untied the shackles of dissension. 112 Those were diverging on the Book, opposed to the Book, and unanimous on opposing the Book! They spoke of God, about God, and about the Book of [218] God without knowledge. They spoke an ambiguous language and deceived the ignorant people by confusing them. Therefore, we seek refuge in God from the dissension of the misleaders.
II. Translation of Khalq
113
[Ibn Ḥanbal] also talked about what was said to be contradictory in the Qurʾān, until he said:
Likewise, al-Jahm 114 and his party invited people to what is ambiguous in the Qurʾān and ḥadīth and misled many people. Among the things that reached us concerning alJahm, the enemy of God, is that he was from the inhabitants of Khurāsān, [particularly] from the inhabitants of al-Tirmidh. He was a man of arguments and [uninformed] discourse (kalām).
115 Most of what he was speaking about (kalām) had to do with God. He met people from the associators called "the Sumanīs."
116 They recognized al-Jahm and said to him, "We will speak to you, and if our argument prevails over you, you will enter our religion. And if your argument prevails over us, we will enter your religion." Among the things they spoke about with al-Jahm were: -Do you not claim to have a God? -Yes, al-Jahm said. 117 Ibn Taymiyya comments on this part of Ibn Ḥanbal's quotation elsewhere, intimating that al-Jahm had no proper understanding of Islam and lacked righteousness and scruples. Nevertheless, he argued with Indian philosophers (i.e., the Sumanīs) who believed only in perceivable things. As a result, he doubted his faith and, not knowing his Lord, did not observe prayers for forty days, (Ṭawāʾif, FK, . 118 See Q. M. Fiey, "Naṣārā," EI 2 , 7:970. The Naṣārā mentioned in the Qurʾān were the Nazoraeans who lived in Arabia during the seventh century. See F. C. de Blois, "Naṣrānī (Ναζωραȋος) and ḥanīf (ἐθνικός): Studies on the Religious Vocabulary of Christianity and of Islam," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 65.1 (2002): 1-17. 119 Also mentioned in Manṭiqiyyīn, 329; Ṭawāʾif, FK, 6:360-64; Talbīs, 2:329-30; Darʾ, 5:165-68. Cf. Ibn Ḥanbal, Radd/Shāhīn, 92-95; idem, Radd/ʿAjamī, 196-99. 120 Ibn Ḥanbal, Radd/Shāhīn, 125-6; Radd/ʿAjamī, 249-52. saying of God 'Surely, the Messiah, Jesus, Son of Mary, was but the Messenger of God and His word, which He cast forth to Mary and a spirit from Him.' [Q4:171] Now, Jesus is created." We thus stated: "God has prevented you from understanding the Qurʾān. There are terms applying to Jesus that do not apply to the Qurʾān. Indeed, to him apply the expressions: 'born,' [Q3:47] Q4:171] is the word which He conveyed to Mary when He said to him 'Be!' Indeed, Jesus came into being by the 'Be!' and Jesus is not the 'Be!' but by the 'Be!' he came into being. The 'Be!' is a saying from God, and the 'Be!' is not created."
Both the Nazarenes and Jahmīs have spoken falsely about God in the matter of Jesus, for the Jahmīs say, "Jesus is the spirit of God and His Word, but the Word is created."
123
The Nazarenes say that [220] Jesus is the spirit of God from the essence of God, and the Word of God from the essence of God, 124 as it is said that this piece of cloth is from this garment. As for us, we say that Jesus was by the word and was not himself the Word.
As for God's saying "a spirit from Him," He says that it is by His command that the spirit was from 125 Him, just as He says: "He has made of service to you whatever is in the skies and whatever is on Earth; everything being from Him." [Q45:11] He means: "from His command," and the explanation of "the Spirit of God" [only carries the meaning] that it is a spirit by the word of God, which God created, as it is said "servant of God" and "sky of God." 126 Thus, Imām Aḥmad mentioned that the Nazarene heretics are those who hold that Jesus' spirit is from God's essence. He also explained that relating the spirit to God is a relation of ownership and creation, like your saying "the servant of God" and "the sky of God," which is not the relation of an attribute to the being thereby Isaac, and Jacob" (Minhāj, . 123 Translated as "because he is the created word" in Thomas Michel, A Muslim Theologian's Response to Christianity: Ibn Taymiyya's Al-Jawab Al-Sahih (New York: Caravan Books, 1984) , 185. 124 Translated as "the spirit of God is of the essence of God, and the word of God is of the essence of God" in ibid, 185. 125 minhu: fīhi F 126 The translation from "But what is meant …" to the end of the next two paragraphs is adapted from Michel, Response to Christianity, 185. described. Those who advocate the spirit's eternity are of two categories. One category includes the Sabian philosophers, who say that the spirit is eternal and pre-eternal, but not from [222] God's essence, and who say the same thing about intellects and celestial souls. People of [different] religions who join them claim that these spirits are the angels. The second category includes the heretics of this community and its straying people from the Sufis, Kalām theologians, and traditionists. They claim that the spirit is from God's essence. These are more evil in what they say than those who belong to the first category, [because] they maintain that the Adamic being [consists of] two halves: divinity (his spirit) and humanity (his body).
[Thus] one half of him is a lord, and the other half is a slave. Now, God declared the Nazarenes unbelievers because they said something similar about the Messiah. So how about those who generalize this about everyone, even about Pharaoh, Hāmān, and Qārūn? 137 Everything that proves that man is a slave [of God], created and subjected [to Him], and that God is his lord, creator, owner, and deity, also proves that his spirit is created. Indeed, man consists of the body and the spirit together. He is, rather, more distinguished by the spirit than by the body. The body is only a mount (maṭi- Also, a plethora of ḥadīths was narrated from the Prophet, God bless him and grant him peace, [indicating] that the spirits are made to die, are subject to bliss and torment, and are told: "Get out, O you good spirit, which was in the good body. Get out, O you wicked spirit, which was in the wicked body." The former is told: "Rejoice at [the good news of having] relief and soothing comfort." [Q56:89] However, the latter is told: "Rejoice at [the good news of having] scalding water, constantly overflowing pus, and other torments of like kind paired together." [Q38:57-58] Moreover, the spirits of the believers ascend to the sky, whereas the doors of the sky are not opened for the souls of the unbelievers. Also, in the authentic Ḥadīth of Ascension, 149 [it is narrated that] the Prophet, God bless him and grant him peace, saw Adam and the spirits of his children on his right and his left. God's Messenger, God bless him and grant him peace, said:
When we ascended to the sky, there was a man with persons on his right and persons on his left. It has been also established that the spirits of believers, martyrs, and others are in the Garden. Imām Aḥmad said in a report [narrated] by Ḥanbal: 151 The spirits of the unbelievers are in the Fire, and the spirits of the believers are in the Garden, while the bodies are in the world. God torments whomever He wills and has mercy by means of His forgiveness on whomever He wills. I asked my father: "Are the spirits of the deceased in the spaces of their tombs or in the crops of birds, or do they die as the bodies die?" He replied that it was narrated from the Prophet, God bless him and grant him peace, that he said, "The spirit of the believer, when he dies, [becomes] a bird that eats from the trees of the Garden until God returns it to his body on the day He resurrects him." 154 Moreover, it was narrated from ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr 155 that he said: "The spirits of believers are in the bellies of green birds like starlings [in the Garden], where they get to know each other and are provided with its fruits." Some people also said: "The spirits of martyrs are in the bellies of green birds that perch in lamps in the Garden hanging from the Throne." Also, Muslim narrated in his Ṣaḥīḥ from Masrūq 156 that he said:
We asked ʿAbd Allāh, i.e., Ibn [225] Maʿsūd, 157 about this verse: "And do not ever consider the ones who have been killed in the path of God [as] dead; no indeed, they are alive with their Lord, [by Him] provided." He said, "Indeed, we asked the Messenger of God, God bless him and grant him peace, about this and he replied: 'Their spirits are in the bellies of green birds for which there are lamps suspended to the Throne. They pasture where they want in the Garden, and then they perch in those lamps. Your Lord looked at them once and asked: "Do you desire anything?" They answered: "What might we desire when we pasture in the Garden where we want?" [God] did that to them three times. When they saw that they would not be left without being asked, they said, "O Lord, we want that you return our spirits to our bodies so that we will be killed in your path once again." When He saw that they had no need [ Proofs of this principle and the explanation of the meanings as well as the commonalities of the "spirit" and the "soul" are too many for this answer to accommodate. We have elaborated on them elsewhere. As for the declaration of God Most High, "Say that the spirit (rūḥ) is from the command of my Lord," it was said that the spirit here is not the spirit of the Adamic being, but rather an angel [as mentioned] in [God's] statements: "The day when the Spirit and the angels will stand in a row," [Q78:38] [227] "The angels and the Spirit will ascend to Him," [Q70:4] and "The angels and the Spirit descend therein by the permission of their Lord." [Q97:4] It was also said: It is, rather, the spirit of the Adamic being. The two sayings are famous. Whether the verse indicates both of them or addresses only one of them, nothing in it proves that the spirit is uncreated, for two reasons. First "command," [as used] in the Qurʾān, is sometimes meant as a verbal noun (maṣḍar) and other times as an object (mafʿūl), namely, that which is commanded. For example, God Most High declares: "The Command of God has come up, so do not seek to hasten it" [Q16:1] and "The command of God is ever a destiny decreed." [Q33:38] This is also [true of] words other than "command," such as "creation," "power," "mercy," "speech," and so on. If the spirit were said to be part (baʿḍ) of 
